ABSTRACT: Ethical self-control is conceived of as self-controlled responding under concurrent contingencies involving (conflicts of) consequences for the individual, and consequences for the group. The study assessed the production of ethical self-control repertoires in laboratory microcultures under four different macrocontingency arrangements. The experiment was held with eleven groups of four college students each. They were exposed to a task that required a choice of odd or even rows in an 8x8 matrix. Odd rows produced higher individual reinforcements and delayed aversive consequences for the group, thus being labeled impulsive selfish choices; even rows produced lower reinforcements for the individual participant, but positive delayed consequences for the group, thus labeled ethical selfcontrolled choices. Each group was exposed to only one condition. In the first condition, each participant was exposed alone to the task, producing high rates of impulsive selfish choices. In the second condition, the four participants were exposed to the task together, with access to one another's choices and being allowed to talk. The result was a high rate of ethical self-controlled choices. In the third condition, participants were exposed to the task together, could talk, but had no direct access to each other´s choices, which also resulted in a high rate of ethical self-controlled choices. In the fourth condition, participants were exposed to the task together, but could not talk, and had no access to each other´s choices. Results from this experiment show a higher rate of impulsive selfish choices. The data on the four conditions suggest that the possibility of verbal interaction has more effect on the emergence of ethical selfcontrolled responses than access to each other´s responses.
Skinner's approach to behavioral phenomena was ruled by a selectionist view of causation since the development of the concept of the operant (Andery & Sério, 2001) . In spite of that, it was only in the beginning of the 1980s that the causal mode of selection by consequences was formally described (Skinner, 1981 (Skinner, /1988 , and behavior was presented as the joint product of three selective levels: a phylogenetic level, an ontogenetic level and a cultural level. The first level regards natural selection processes, of which biological and genetic traits are the product; the second level encompasses the selection of operant behavior by contingencies of reinforcement; and the third level corresponds to the selection of group practices (Skinner, 1981 (Skinner, /1988 .
Even though Skinner himself had written about cultural phenomena (e.g., Skinner, 1953 Skinner, /1965 1971 , it was after the 1981 article that many other behavior analysts systematically approached cultural and social phenomena (e.g., Andery, 2001; Andery, Micheletto & Sério, 2005; Dittrich, 2008; Glenn, 1988 Glenn, , 1989 Glenn, , 1991 Glenn, , 2003 Glenn, , 2004 Glenn & Malott, 2004; Malott & Glenn, 2006; Todorov, 1987 Todorov, , 2005 Todorov, , 2006 Todorov, , 2009 Vichi, Andery & Glenn, 2009 ). Behavior analysts have been studying social behavior for two main reasons: first, the importance to the understanding and control of individual behavior, since the major part of the environment that controls human behavior is made of other people (cf. Andery & cols., 2005; Skinner, 1953 Skinner, /1965 ; second, the need to provide the technology required to work out human issues, including interventions focused on a great number of people (cf. Malott & Glenn, 2006; Tourinho, 2009) .
A major issue in the study of cultural phenomena is the unit of analysis. As Andery et al. (2005) point out, the three-term contingency addresses directly the behavior of the individual, but not the effects of that behavior for the culture. In this paper, we will approach cultural issues with the concept of macrocontingencies, which has been used by behavior analysts (Glenn, 2004; Malott & Glenn, 2006) to approach some cultural phenomena.
According to Glenn (2004) a macrocontingency is the relation between a cultural practice and the aggregate sum of consequences of the macrobehavior constituting the practice ... The recurring behavior of each person has its own effects, and the relation between the behavior and that effect can alter the probability or the recurrence of that individual behavior ... In addition to those individuated consequences, the combined behavior of all the people (the macrobehavior) has a cumulative effect. This effect cannot function as a behavioral consequence because it is not contingent on the behavior of any individual ... It is contingent on the macrobehavior of the cultural practice. An important feature of macrocontingencies is that their cumulative effects are additive. The more widespread a practice, the greater its cumulative effects; the greater the cumulative effects, the more important they are to the well-being of large numbers of people. (Glenn, 2004, pp. 142-143) In a macrobehavior, the behavior of all members of a group is not necessarily interlocked (that means the behavior of other people is not required to be functionally related to the behavior of the individual), nor does it occur in an organized way. Even so, the macrobehavior can produce consequences for the group as a whole. The recurring behavior of different people with similar topographies or functions, that composes a macrobehavior, can produce a consequence (other than the operant consequence) that may only be created by the cumulative effect of these responses. This consequence is called cumulative effect (Glenn, 2004) . Thus, macrobehavior regards functionally independent operant contingencies that give rise to a cumulative effect.
The concept of the macrocontingency has been useful to describe a series of social problems that can be approached by behavior analysts (Glenn, 2004; Malott & Glenn, 2004) . These problems are produced by the cumulative effect of individual behavior that, when emitted by multiple people and/or for a long time can create aversive effects for the group as a whole. Glenn (2004) discusses the example of using one's own car to go the work. Individually, this response does not create aversive effects for the group. However, when a great number of the people in a city use their own car to go to work, instead of the public transportation, the result is traffic jams and an increase in air pollution-which may be considered social issues. Traffic jams (cumulative product of many people driving their own car to work) do not necessarily affect the behavior of each individual: they are not always discriminative stimuli, reinforcers or punishers to the response of driving your own car, for example. Other variables may exert more control of the individual behaviors (e.g., more comfort, less time spent, more security). The behavior of driving to work is probably selected and controlled by individual contingencies of reinforcement, but it has a cumulative effect. We can call a macrocontingency the relation between the behavior of multiple people engaging in similar behavior and the cumulative product of these behaviors.
It's important to clarify that, even if it describes relations among the cumulative effect on the environment of the multiple independent behavioral contingencies, the concept of macrocontingency keeps focus on operant lineages (Glenn, 2004; Malott & Glenn, 2006) . Glenn (2004) points out that the cumulative product is not contingent on each occurrence of individual reinforcement: it is produced by the sum of many occurrences. An intervention in an issue created by a macrocontingency, even if it can be described as a cultural intervention (as it is affecting many people at once), is still an intervention on the behavior of the individuals, since "the only selection contingencies involved in macrocontingency are operant contingencies" (Malott & Glenn, 2006, p. 46 , italics from the original). Even though it describes relations at a group level, the macrocontingency is not a unit of analysis for the third level of selection. That would be a metacontingency (for an overview of metacontingencies as a unit of analysis in the third level of selection, see Glenn, 2004) .
The analysis of social phenomena is not new to experimental research in behavior analysis. Experiments have been conducted to analyze phenomena such as cooperation and competition, but mainly focusing on individual responses, as pressing a button (e.g., Hake & Vukelich, 1973; Schmitt, 1976) . In experiments like these, the behavior of cooperation (responding under control of a co-participant) would lead to reinforcers of higher magnitude than responding individually. These experiments provide important insights on some parameters of social behavior, but they fail to look at the relation between the behavior of the members of the group and the results of those interrelated behaviors. The concept of macrocontingencies can help to look at these phenomena in ways that could lead to effective discussion of some kinds of cultural practices. Other behavior-analytic studies have investigated social phenomena and selection in the third level (e.g., Baum, Richerson, Efferson & Paciotti, 2004; Ortu, Becker, Woelz & Glenn, 2012; Vichi, Andery & Glenn, 2009; Ward, Eastman & Ninness, 2009 ), but none of them has focused on macrocontingencies.
Vichi, Andery and Glenn (2009) investigated selection of interlocked behavioral contingencies by metacontingencies, and the experimental preparation they used may be helpful in approaching macrocontingencies as well. In this experiment, two groups of four people each were exposed to a game of bets where there was a consequence to the group as a whole. In the procedure, an 8x8 matrix was projected on the wall. In each of its cells, there was either a plus (+) or a minus (-) sign. The participants had to bet tokens in one of the 8 rows. The tokens were exchanged for money at the end of each session. After they made their bets, the experimenter announced which was the column he had chosen. If in the intersection of the row the participants chose and the column the experimenter pointed out there was a plus sign, they would double the number of tokens bet. If there was a minus sign, they would receive only half of what they had bet. They then had to distribute the amount of tokens received to all four participants. They also could deposit any amount they pleased in a participant's pool. Thus, they could divide the same amount of tokens to each one of them (making an equal distribution) or different amounts to each one (an unequal distribution). In certain occasions, the experimenter could decide how many tokens would be deposited in the participant's pool, to make more probable an equal or unequal distribution (an analog of forced choice procedure).
The criterion the experimenter used to choose a column in the matrix was based on the distribution of tokens in the previous round of the experiment: in one condition (called Condition A), the experimenter would choose a column that would give the participants a plus sign if they had distributed tokens equally, and a minus sign if they had distributed the tokens unequally. In the other condition (Condition B), the experimenter would choose a column that resulted in a plus sign whenever the participants had made an unequal distribution in the previous trial, and a minus sign whenever they had distributed equally.
The experiment applied a reversal design, with one of the groups in an A-B-A-B design and the other in a B-A-B design. Results of the experiments suggest that the aggregate product selected the pattern of distribution of tokens: in the Condition A, it selected a pattern of equal distribution, and in the Condition B it selected a pattern of unequal distribution. However, the selection of the unequal distribution took longer than the equal distribution, and the intervention of the experimenter deciding how many tokens would be deposited in the participant's pool was a relevant variable. After these interventions the change in conditions would quickly change the pattern of distribution of tokens earned after the bets.
In this paper, we seek to investigate the selection of behavior at the operant level, but our interest lies on the effect of a cumulative product on the individual behavior. We are especially interested in the selection of behavior when there is a conflict between the consequences for the group and consequences for the individual. This kind of conflict is present in most of the cultural environments of modern societies (cf. Elias, 1984 Elias, /1994 ), and will be described here as an instance of ethical self-control (cf. Tourinho & Vichi, 2012; Tourinho, Borba, Vichi & Leite, 2011) .
Conflicts between consequences in concurrent schedules may be found in many contexts of interaction with the environment. When exposed to conflicting contingencies, individual and group interests may differ (Skinner, 1953 (Skinner, /1965 . In such cases, members of the group may act to arrange contingencies that would help (or at least not damage) the group as a whole. For example, group members can reinforce responses that produce favorable consequences to the group and/or punish those that would produce aversive consequences. Skinner understood self-control (e.g., 1953 Skinner understood self-control (e.g., /1965 1968 as a series of (controlling) responses by an individual that changes the environment, and affects the probability of other (controlled) responses. Thus, though the controlling variables are in the environment, the individual can take an important role in the construction of such environment. Skinner (1953 Skinner ( /1965 ) discusses self-control mainly concerning the control that an individual can exert over its own behavior, manipulating the environment to make some responses more probable. However, when addressing ethical self-control, Skinner takes the discussion to a new level that involves not only consequences to the behaving person, but for the group as a whole. It is not a case of simple individual behavior that can be analyzed with a three-term contingency. The behavior analyst must use new conceptual tools to describe the functional relation of the behavior of the individuals and the effects of that behavior to many individuals (Glenn, 2004) .
In this paper, we add the adjective ethical to those circumstances in which self-controlled responses produce both (conflicting) consequences for the individual and consequences for the group. As in other instances of self-control, the organism can behave in different ways, and the concurrent responses produce different outcomes. Typically, in ethical self-control, the individual behaves in ways that produce consequences for himself of lower magnitude along with consequences more favorable to the group in the long run. In self-control situations, the conflict is between immediate lower magnitude reinforcers and delayed higher magnitude reinforcers. In the ethical self-control situations, the conflict would be between immediate consequences for the individual that also produce a higher aversive stimuli for the group, and a response that produces immediate lower magnitude reinforcers for the individual and a delayed higher magnitude for the group (cf. Tourinho & Vichi, 2012) . Skinner (1968 Skinner ( /2003 has mentioned similar instances of individual behavior under the concept of "ethical selfmanagement." Rachlin (2002) has called the same kind of response as "altruism," in opposition to "selfish" responses. We prefer the use of the concept "self-control" as it is a technical concept found in behavior analytic literature to describe behavior under the control of delayed consequences when the organism is exposed to concurrent contingencies (Rachlin, 2000) .
Ethical self-control is most important when the (concurrent, impulsive) behavior of the individual can produce aversive delayed consequences for the group (Rachlin, 2000 (Rachlin, , 2002 . As Baum (2000) states, the function of culture practices maintained by a group is often to promote ethical self-controlled behavior. Common examples include throwing trash in the streets, disobeying traffic laws, exaggerated consumption of fatty food and/or alcoholic drinks, and so on. In such cases, the subject behaves under the control of immediate consequences affecting him or herself (get rid of the trash, get to the destination faster, food or drink). However, if that response is emitted in high rates and/or by a large number of people, it can produce aversive consequences for the group as a whole in the long run (dirty streets, diseases, traffic accidents, costs in public health care with the number of coronary diseases or because of alcohol abuse). When behavior only produces effects after many individuals have engaged in that behavior over a long time, the probability that those effects will influence the behavior of an individual is small. Additionally, the amount that each member of the group contributes for the effect may be so small that does not affect the behavior of the individual. For example, the consequences of global warming caused by too much fossil fuel use will likely be contacted only by future generations of drivers or only contacted after an individual has a long history of reinforcement concerning driving. Either way, the amount that a particular individual affects the global warming by using his or her own car to move around in the city is so small that the effect itself may not cause change in his or her behavior.
In ethical self-control, responses called impulsive are immediately reinforced by consequences for the individual, but produce delayed aversive (or lower reinforcement) consequences for the group. In the prior examples, we could have immediate consequences (get rid of the trash, get to the destination faster) reinforcing the individual's behavior, but delayed effects (dirty streets, traffic accidents) for the group, without necessarily affecting the rates of behavior of the individual (for example, if many individuals litter, any one of those individuals may never become ill, while the overall incidence or prevalence of disease within the group may increase).
Experiments about cooperation in a group in situations of self-control have been designed in a way that members get more in the long run, when they cooperate among themselves (emitting self-controlled responses instead of impulsive ones), than groups that behave in noncooperative ways (e.g., Brown & Rachlin, 1999 ; see also chapter 7 in Rachlin, 2000) . The conflicts between the group and the individual are generated because, while self-controlled choice produce reinforcements of higher magnitude in the long run, in the short term the individual contacts reinforcers of lesser magnitude (or even aversive). This can lead a participant to behave impulsively, gaining immediate reinforcement for himself (cf. Rachlin, 2002; Yi & Rachlin, 2004) .
In a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (as presented by Bonacich, Shure, Kahan & Meeker, 1976; Brown & Rachlin, 1999; Dawes, 1980; Rachlin, 2000; Yi & Rachlin, 2004) , each participant has two options: cooperate or defect. Participants earn money according to how many people cooperate, and a bonus if they themselves defect: considering "N" the number of cooperating participants, those that would cooperate would earn (Nx3) cents, while those that defect would earn (Nx3) + 7 cents. This guarantees that participants maximize winnings in the long run if they all cooperate; however, defect will always guarantee the bigger reward if all the other participants are cooperating, but produces lesser reward if the others (at least one more) also defect. The impulsive choice is maintained by immediate reinforcement, at the expense of diminishing the earnings of the group as a whole. The studies in this area have shown that as the number of people increase, so does the number of the defecting behavior (Yi & Rachlin, 2004) ; the possibility to communicate, as the possibility to know what the other players would do (Rachlin, 2000) also increases the chances of self-controlled responses.
Ortu, Becker, Woelz and Glenn (2012) used an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game (IPDG) to analyze the effects of a cultural consequence in the interlocked behavioral contingencies (IBC's) and the aggregate product of these contingencies. The results of the experiments have shown the successful selection of patterns of responding-the cultural consequence was effective in selecting both patterns of behavior: four cooperating responses in one condition, and four defecting responses in the other. This was achieved even when doing so would produce less points than the alternative behavior (in Experiment 4).
The experiments reported in Ortu et al. (2012) present important data about the selection of metacontingencies, but do not discuss what happen in a situation where there is not a cultural consequence contingent on interlocked behavioral patterns. Studies with IPDG also do not discuss their data as the behavior of independent people that produced a delayed effect to the whole group. In that way, the set of contingencies in IPDG could be useful to analyze what the literature have been calling macrocontingencies.
The concept of macrocontingencies can be useful to approach phenomena in which the behavior of the individuals in a group produce consequences for the group as a whole, even though their behavior is controlled by individual consequences. The concept of the macrocontingency can offer an experimental design that allows for the study of cultural phenomena in the context of concurrent schedules that involve ethical self-control.
This paper compares the effect of four macrocontingencies in the production of ethical selfcontrol. It is the first experimental study on macrocontingencies, and, as such, addresses a few basic issues in the field. The study assesses the effects of the cumulative product and challenges the notion that it has no selective effects on the macrobehavior. It aims to assess the effects of a cumulative effect on the frequency of ethical self-controlled responses, when members of the group respond with or without access to the behavior of each other, and when members of the group are or are not allowed to interact orally. Four conditions were conducted: in the first, four members of a group were individually exposed to the concurrent contingencies; in the second, the participants were exposed to the task together and had access to each other's behavior, and were allowed to interact verbally; in the third condition, the members of a group were exposed to the task together, and were able to interact verbally, but had no access to each other's behavior; in the fourth condition, participants were exposed to the task together, and neither had access to each other's behavior nor were they allowed to interact verbally.
General Method
Participants 44 college students, between the ages of 18 to 24 years old participated in this study. These students were recruited in the classrooms in the university, from any course except for psychology.
Setting
All experiments were conducted in an experimental room, sizing 9.0 x 7.0 feet, with a conference table and chairs. Contiguous to the experimental room, there was an observation room, separated by a unidirectional mirror, where there was a computer, which ran the software used in the experiments.
Equipment
One desktop computer with an Intel ® Core2Duo, 2.20 GHz processor, 2 MB of RAM and a Windows ® Vista Home Premium operating system was used as a server. The participants conducted the task on four notebook computers with Intel ® Pentium ® Dual, 1.86 GHz processors, 1 MB of RAM and Windows ® Vista Home Basic operating system. All computers had the Metamatrix 0.16 software, custom designed by Thomas Woelz on Python 2.5.2 language to run this experiment, installed. Instructions printed on A4 paper were given to all participants.
Procedure
Eleven groups of four participants each were exposed to the experimental sessions. There were four conditions, and in all of them the participants had to perform the same task. Two groups were exposed to Condition 1, and three different groups were exposed to each of the remaining conditions.
The task consisted of choosing a row in an 8x8 matrix shown in a computer screen. Rows were numbered from 1 to 8, and the columns were named A to H. Odd rows were black in color, while even rows were white. In each of the matrix's cells there was either a plus sign (+) or a minus sign (-). Figure 1 shows the computer screen, as the participants would see it.
In each trial, the participant had to choose a row in the matrix, by clicking with the mouse on the number of the row. After the row was chosen, the computer chose a column. If in the intersection of the participant's row with the computer's column there was a plus sign, the participant received the programmed consequences, as described below. If there was a minus sign, it was considered a loss. The computer's choice of the column was semi-random, with a .8 probability that it would select a column that would produce a plus sign.
Each participant received money for participating in the experiment, which were deposited in two "accounts": an individual bank, which paid to the participant at the end of the session; and a collective bank, whose value was equally divided by all four group members, and paid one week after the session.
The consequences of winning each trial game depended on the choice of even or odd rows. If the participant chose an odd row, he or she received $0.40 on his or her individual bank, but the value of $0.10 would be reduced from the collective bank. If the participant chose an even row, he or she would receive a deposit of $0.20 in his/her individual bank, but the value of $0.40 would be added to the collective bank. The values can be seen in Table 1 .
As observed, choices in odd rows were immediately reinforced in higher magnitude, but produced a delayed aversive consequence for the group. Choices in even rows produced lower magnitude of immediate reinforcement, but produced delayed higher magnitude positive consequences for the group. It's important to note that, with the set of values presented in Table  1 , the amount produced by each choice was such that the individual always earned more money than the other participants in a single trial when he or she made a choice in an odd row. The group as a whole earned more money when everyone chose even rows. The fact the group won 
The Trial
At the beginning of each trial, each participant saw on his or her screen the matrix, instructions on what to do, and the amount of money he or she had in the individual bank and the amount the group had in the collective bank. Then the participant had to choose a row. After a choice was made, a text box appeared asking the participant to confirm the choice. If he or she clicked "no," a new row could be chosen.
If the participant clicked "yes," the computer presented the chosen column, after a 2 seconds animation. The software then opened a text box, where it showed the row and column chosen, and if the participant won or lost. The software showed how much was earned and how much there was in the individual (that would be received by the end of the session) and the collective bank (that would be divided by the participants after one week) after the participant's choice. A screenshot can be seen in Figure 1 .
Experimental conditions
Each four-person group was assigned to one of the four experimental conditions, which varied regarding the presence of other members of the group, the possibility of direct access to each other's responses, and the possibility of participants being allowed to talk among themselves. No group was exposed to more than one condition.
Two groups were exposed to Condition 1, in which they were instructed and exposed to the task alone. They were instructed to arrive at different times in the lab. They all knew they were part of a group, even if they were not in the room together. The only access to other participant's choices was how much money was left in the Collective Bank in the beginning of each participant's session.
Three groups were exposed to Condition 2. In this one, participants were instructed and exposed together to the task. Being all in the same room together, participants were allowed to talk freely. At the beginning of each trial, the participants would select their rows and press "ok" on the screen. After all participants had chosen their rows, the result of the columns of each one would appear on the screen, and the consequences would be delivered to the individual banks and the collective bank. In this condition, each participant received feedback on what each participant had chosen, and whether he or she won or lost, giving the participants direct access to each other's behavior (Figure 1, right panel) .
Three groups were exposed to Condition 3. Here, participants were also instructed and exposed to the task together, and could talk freely among themselves. Differently than Condition 2, however, each participant received feedback only on his or her own behavior, thus having no direct access to each other's behavior (Figure 1, left panel) . Finally, three more groups were exposed to Condition 4. Participants were exposed and instructed together to the task, but were forbidden to talk to each other during the experimental session. As in Condition 3, they had no direct access to each other's behavior.
Results
Figure 2 is a set of four cumulative records that shows the frequency of ethical self-control choices over trials in each group. Each cumulative record represents one condition. As there were four possible choices in each of the 20 trials, it was possible to choose one kind of row up to 80 times.
In Condition 1 participants were exposed to the task one at a time. Group 1 participants have chosen white rows 25 times, and Group 2 participants chose 31 times. This represents respectively 31.25% and 38.75% of possible choices.
Results for Condition 2, in which participants were exposed to the task together, had direct access to each other's choice, and could communicate, show higher frequency of choices in even rows. Groups 3, 4 and 5 performed 62, 54 and 73 choices in even rows, respectively. That corresponds to 77.5%, 67.5% and 91.25% of the total, respectively. Groups in Condition 3, in which participants were exposed to the task together, had no direct access to each other's choice, and could communicate, showed a similar frequency of choices in even rows. Group 6 made 63 choices in even rows (78.8% of all possible), Group 7 made 56 (70.0%) and Group 8 made 77 (96.3%) choices.
In Condition 4, groups were exposed to the task together, had no direct access to each other's responses and could not communicate. The results are closer to the results of Condition 1: Group 9 performed 39 choices in even rows, 48.8% of the total; Group 10 performed 39 choices (37.5%), and Group 11 performed 35 choices in white rows, 43.8% of the total possibilities.
As there is little difference from one group to the other in the same condition, Figure 3 plots the data of individual participants of the first group of each condition. In the Y-axis of the graph we have all possible combinations of even and odd rows. The points in the graph show the pattern of response in each trial. In condition 1, P1 was the participant that chose even rows more often, in 7 of the 20 trials. It is important to notice that, in condition 1, although the graph shows that there were trials in which all four participants chose even (in trials 15 and 18) or odd rows (in trials 1, 2, 6, 12 and 16), the participants were not in the same room nor were exposed to the task at the same time.
In conditions 2 and 3, it is possible to notice a larger number of choices in even rows, as seen in the higher number of choices in the higher section of the graph. In condition 2, in five trials there were two impulsive choices; in the other 15, there were only one or none impulsive choices. In condition 3, there were two trials with two or more impulsive choices: in trial 10, where Participants 3 and 4 chose odd rows; and in trial 5, where the four participants made impulsive choices.
In condition 4, in six trials there were three choices in even rows. In all the others, there were at least 2 choices in odd rows. It is important to notice that in this condition there was no trial where all the participants chose odd rows, as there was no trial where there were four even rows.
Discussion
In the experiment reported, we manipulated different conditions in which ethical self-control responses might be produced, corresponding to presence or absence of the members of the group, access and no access to the responses of each member of the group, and possibility of verbal interaction among the members of the groups. The conditions arranged might be described as macrocontingencies, since the individual responses might produce a cumulative effect that affects the whole group. Choices in even rows produced an immediate, lower individual reinforcer, but contributed to a variable amount that was a result of the behavior of all members of the group. These choices can be understood as ethical self-control choices. Choices in odd rows produced a higher, immediate amount of money to the individual, while reducing the amount the group received -and, in the long run, the amount that the individual him or herself could have received. These were understood as impulsive choices, in the same sense that Rachlin (2000) has used the concept: a response that produces a lower payout, concurring with a response that would produce a larger, delayed payout.
In the experiments described here, the collective bank functioned as a cumulative product of each participant's behavior. The results of individual choices for the collective bank were very small, but when the whole group behaved in a self-controlled pattern, the impacts would produce a higher payout in the long run.
In all conditions, the payout for self-control and impulsive choices were the same. The only variation was the access to the other participants and their choices. Thus we can point out that the differences between the groups are a result of the manipulations. The results suggest that the possibility to talk to the other players was the main variable responsible for the ethical selfcontrolled responses. Conditions 2 and 3 show higher frequencies of choices of white rows, as it is possible to see in Figures 2 and 3. It's also possible to see in Figure 2 that the pattern is stable through time. Ethical self-control choices are more frequent in the conditions in which communication was allowed since the very first trials.
Another point of interest is that the results suggest that the direct access to the behavior of each member of the group is not likely to be an important variable when communication is possible (see the small difference between the averages in conditions 2 and 3). The results for conditions 1 and 4, in which no communication was allowed, also suggest that the presence of the group is not as relevant a variable as the communication among its members.
The results of the experiment are consistent with conceptual approaches to macrocontingencies, especially with the idea that the cumulative product, being delayed and dependent on other people's behavior, may not control individual responses (Glenn, 2004) .
Results for conditions 1 and 4 confirm that. On the other hand, conditions 2 and 3 suggest that the cumulative effect can affect the macrobehavior in these situations. This may be a interesting finding for the discussion of the concept of macrocontingency as is discussed by Glenn (2004) and Malott and Glenn (2006) .
It is important to notice, thought, that the conditions arranged in the experiments are not strict analogs of macrocontingencies, since there were possible interactions (thus, interlocking behavioral contingencies -IBCs) among the members of the group (especially, in conditions 2, 3 and 4). However, the cumulative effect was not the result of IBCs, and this effect was an additional consequence beyond the individual consequence produced by the behavior of each participant (the macrobehavior). Even so, we chose to deal with the current experiment as a macrocontingency based on the idea that the effect we are analyzing is contingent on individual responses, and not on particular interlocking contingencies. What is selected, if anything, are the behaviors of each individual, and not interlocking behavioral contingencies as in a metacontingency. It is not the aim of this paper to go through a conceptual discussion, but it should be noted that the results presented here show that either macrocontingencies (under certain conditions-e.g., contact with the aggregate product, same nature as individual consequences, etc.) may alter the probability of macrobehaviors, or the conditions arranged in the experiments correspond to a type of cultural phenomena which is neither a macrocontingency, nor a metacontingency.
Results are also consistent with the literature about self-control and groups (e.g., Brown & Rachlin, 1999) . As presented by Rachlin (2000) , the possibility of knowing what the other members will do next (in our experiments, by means of the participants' verbal behavior) improves the rate of self-controlled choices (Conditions 2 and 3) .
The relevance of verbal interaction is highlighted in conditions 2, 3 and 4. In Condition 4, the impossibility of communication, even with the physical presence of other people, resulted in a lower rate of self-controlled choices. This seems to be an analog of conditions in which, even though we can see people behaving, it is not possible to predict their next responses, as Rachlin (2000) points out. A good example is inside the car in traffic. Although it is possible to physically see other people, we have no access to their future behavior: even if usually they would follow traffic rules, there is no way to know if a driver will behave in an impulsive way. Skinner (1953 Skinner ( /1965 ) discussed the importance of verbal behavior as a controlling variable to behavior in cases in which consequences are delayed. As delayed consequences may not control behavior, verbal behavior can function as a more immediate consequence to behavior, frequently (but not necessarily always) punishing impulsive behavior in self-control or ethical self-control situations. Although we did not analyze the participant's verbal behavior itself in the presented experiments, the results suggest that it was critical to the production of ethical self-control responses.
The experiment presented in this paper was exploratory in nature, and its major role was to suggest relevant features of some cultural phenomena described as macrocontingency relations. The results presented here are relevant for three reasons: they provide the first experimental evidence of macrocontingencies; they suggest that the macrocontingency relation may be a valid unit of analysis for some cultural phenomena; and they suggest that, perhaps, we should look more closely at the assumption that there is no selection in macrocontingencies. Future research may investigate further that assumption in different situations. In the present experiment, it was easy to notice the effects of each participant's responses in the cumulative product. As individual reinforcers and the cumulative effects have the same nature (both are money to be paid to the participants), ultimately participants who chose even rows would receive more money. So, new research may investigate the effects of the cumulative product in a design in which the cumulative product and the individual reinforcers are of a different nature. It's also important to conduct further research analyzing parametric dimensions of the variables manipulated in this study, in order to assess the generality of these findings. Finally, observational or quasiexperimental designs could be used to find out if the results here described could help in advancing the teaching or the increase of ethical behavior in applied settings.
As new data arise concerning cultural levels of analysis (Mattaini, 2009 ), studies about the selection of ethical self-control in the third level of selection are still just beginning to be gathered. As such, additional research is necessary to advance the field.
